For years, the story was straightforward: after pushing out French and European forces, Mali turned to Russia. Under General Assimi Goïta, Bamako made Moscow its primary security partner, welcoming Wagner fighters and later the Africa Corps, while steadily cutting ties with Western partners.
By 2026, that narrative is beginning to crack. Mali has not formally broken with Russia. Yet the signs of a rapprochement with the United States are piling up: intelligence cooperation, talks over American surveillance flights, and the lifting of sanctions targeting senior Malian officials. The fallout from these moves is now feeding a lively public debate in Bamako and beyond, and the outlook is shifting fast. Mali appears to be seeking to diversify its alliances — and Washington has once again become a preferred interlocutor.
The quiet return of Washington
The most striking signal of this shift concerns military intelligence.
In March 2026, it emerged that Washington and Bamako were close to an agreement allowing the United States to resume aircraft and drone flights over Mali to monitor jihadist groups, notably JNIM, an Al-Qaeda affiliate. The talks followed the American decision in February to lift sanctions against Mali’s defense minister and several senior officials.
This development is far from trivial.
During the period of tension with Western powers, Bamako had presented Russia as the partner capable of replacing the old Western powers. Today, Malian authorities are once again willing to discuss with Washington capabilities they clearly need: intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.
The United States had already shared intelligence with Malian authorities, some of which is said to have contributed to an operation against JNIM figures. Washington now wants to institutionalize this cooperation further.
The paradox is striking: Mali, which had turned its back on the West to move closer to Moscow, may be rediscovering Washington’s strategic usefulness.
The uncomfortable Russian security record
Why is this change happening now? Part of the answer lies in the security record of recent years.
Precision is needed here: the arrival of Wagner in Mali does not mean the entire security deterioration can be blamed on Russia. The country was already facing a jihadist insurgency before French forces left. Armed groups have deep local roots and benefit from political, social, economic and geographic factors that go far beyond the presence of any foreign power.
But the statistics paint a reality that is hard to sidestep: replacing Western partners with Russian forces did not durably halt the violence.
The US State Department’s 2022 report indicated that terrorist activities had increased in number and lethality. That year, France completed its withdrawal from Mali, with the last French soldier leaving on August 15, 2022. At the same time, Malian forces occupied former French positions with Wagner’s support. The State Department described 2022 as the deadliest year in Mali’s history in terms of terrorist violence and counterterrorism operations.
The following year did not reverse the trend.
According to the 2023 US terrorism report, terrorist activities increased further in number and intensity. The document describes 2023 as the deadliest year in Mali’s history, taking into account both terrorist attacks and operations by Malian forces conducted with Wagner.
The finding is particularly embarrassing for the narrative that presented the Russian partnership as the solution to Mali’s security problem.
From Wagner to the Africa Corps: Moscow has not disappeared
It would, however, be premature to announce Russia’s departure.
Wagner has been gradually replaced by the Africa Corps, directly linked to the Russian Ministry of Defense. Moscow therefore retains a significant military and political presence in Mali.
But that presence is also suffering setbacks.
In April 2026, an offensive by JNIM and Tuareg fighters inflicted serious reverses on Malian forces and their Russian allies. Mali’s defense minister, Sadio Camara, who was trained in Russia, was killed in an attack. The Africa Corps also had to withdraw from Kidal, a strategic northern city it had helped retake in 2023.
At the time, it was reported that these setbacks had seriously damaged Russia’s image as a guarantor of security in Mali. ACLED analyst Héni Nsaibia even argued that JNIM’s successive campaigns, the fuel blockade and recent events illustrated the failure of the Russian intervention.
This is, of course, an analysis, not a universal verdict. But it illustrates a problem that has become hard to ignore: Moscow has not succeeded in ending the insurgency.
Security still under pressure
The figures available in 2025 reinforce that question.
According to ACLED data, Malian forces and the Russian paramilitary groups Wagner and Africa Corps reportedly killed 918 civilians in Mali in 2025, compared with 232 attributed to JNIM and the Islamic State in the Sahel. These figures cover documented deaths and should therefore be interpreted with caution. They nonetheless reflect the scale of the violence and the accusations facing government forces and their Russian allies.
At the same time, jihadists continued to advance. JNIM notably managed to disrupt the country’s supply routes and impose considerable pressure on Bamako.
In March 2026, Malian authorities even released around 200 people detained for suspected links to jihadists as part of an arrangement aimed at securing a truce on attacks on fuel convoys.
For a junta that came to power promising to restore sovereignty and security, the symbol is heavy.
Mali may no longer be choosing between Moscow and Washington
It would, however, be too early to speak of a break with Russia.
Moscow retains considerable interests in Mali, notably in the gold, lithium and energy sectors. Russia has supported mining and energy projects and continues to assert its commitment alongside Bamako.
Mali’s strategy therefore seems to be evolving toward a pragmatic logic: no longer depending on a single partner.
After making Moscow its main security recourse following the French departure, Bamako now seems to recognize that Russia alone cannot meet all its military and intelligence needs.
This is where the United States reappears.
Washington offers what Moscow does not necessarily provide under the same conditions: aerial and satellite intelligence capability, considerable technological means and deep knowledge of jihadist networks.
The rapprochement with America may therefore be less an ideological conversion than a pragmatic conclusion: Mali needs several partners to confront a threat that its alliance with Russia has failed to eliminate.
From Western rupture to pragmatism
Mali’s recent history is thus undergoing another reversal.
Yesterday, Bamako denounced the French and European presence and presented Russia as the sovereign alternative. Today, talks with Washington are resuming at a level that would have seemed improbable just a few years ago.
Russia remains in Mali. But its security record is contested, its forces are facing setbacks and jihadists continue to threaten the country.
In this context, the US-Mali rapprochement appears as much more than a simple diplomatic episode. It could mark the beginning of a new foreign policy for Bamako: no longer replacing one partner with another, but using rivalry between great powers to obtain from each what Mali needs.
Mali has therefore not yet abandoned Russia. But one thing is now clear: the Russian monopoly on Mali’s security partnership may already belong to the past.
