The return of silence to the streets of Niamey may be deceptive. The battle is finished, but the political war has only just begun.
During the night of 28-29 August, Nigerien soldiers attempted to overthrow the regime of General Abdourahamane Tiani. The attack, launched notably by troops from units engaged on various fronts across the country, targeted strategic installations in the capital, including Air Base 101 and areas near the presidential palace. For several hours, the government teetered on the brink.
To save it, Tiani had to call on his Russian allies. The men of Africa Corps, successors to the Wagner Group in Africa, intervened alongside loyalist Nigerien forces. They took part in retaking the airbase and neutralising the mutinous soldiers. The Nigerien army regained control of the base with the support of Russian paramilitary forces.
Here lies the major political fact of this crisis: Nigerien soldiers were fought on Nigerien soil with the direct support of Russian forces who came to protect the regime born from the 2023 coup. Yet the junta had made national sovereignty its primary argument for expelling French and American forces.
Sovereignty with a double standard
For years, Tiani and his supporters told Nigeriens that the French military presence was a humiliation and an infringement on national sovereignty. The French soldiers left. The Americans were asked to leave. Western military agreements were denounced. The regime’s propaganda could then proclaim that Niger had finally regained its full independence.
But an embarrassing question now arises: what is the point of chasing out the French military if, a few years later, the government must call on Russian forces to save its presidential seat? The question is even more explosive because the Russians did not intervene to defend Nigerien territory against jihadist groups. They came to help the government repel Nigerien soldiers who threatened the regime. The symbolism is devastating.
Nigerien soldiers have been dying for years in the Sahel’s conflict zones. They fight the Islamic State and JNIM, suffer heavy losses, and regularly denounce their combat conditions. The Niamey mutiny seems to have been fuelled precisely by this accumulated frustration within units facing daily jihadist violence. And when these same soldiers turn against the government, it is the Russians who come to fight them. What sovereignty remains when national authorities cannot ensure their own survival without foreign protection?
Growing rift between Tiani and his army
The 29 August mutiny is arguably the most serious warning Tiani has received since coming to power. The problem is not just that soldiers tried to overthrow him, but that they could do so while Niger officially possesses a considerable security apparatus. Moreover, dissent seems to have found fertile ground within the ranks of the regular army itself.
Soldiers engaged on the front lines are the ones who pay the highest price of war. They see their comrades fall, face material hardships, and witness jihadist attacks continuing despite the junta’s promises. Since 2023, Tiani promised to restore security and return dignity to Niger. Three years later, jihadist violence remains a major threat, and Nigerien forces continue to suffer significant losses.
It is in this context that part of the army now seems to wonder whether the regime has strayed from those who actually fight on the ground. The Russian intervention may have turned this frustration into hatred. A Nigerien soldier may accept dying for his country and endure hardships in the name of the nation, but he will find it far harder to accept foreigners firing at him to protect a political regime.
Tiani: from Bazoum’s toppler to Moscow’s protégé
The historical paradox is dizzying. In July 2023, Tiani seized power claiming he wanted to save Niger from a political system incapable of ensuring citizens’ security. He overthrew democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum, ostensibly to end the failures of civilian rule. Today, three years later, his own power requires foreign fighters to withstand a military revolt.
Tiani came to power through a coup. He now stays in power thanks to a security apparatus of which an essential component is Russian. In other words, the man who claimed to liberate Niger from foreign tutelage seems to have replaced a Western dependence with a Russian one. It is precisely this contradiction that could become the regime’s Achilles heel.
What if Bazoum had accepted French help?
One must also rewind to July 2023. When Tiani overthrew Mohamed Bazoum, France still had over a thousand soldiers in Niger. Paris supported the elected president and, under certain circumstances, contemplated an operation to help secure his release. Close associates of Bazoum had requested a French intervention. According to information at the time, an operation was considered, but Bazoum ultimately preferred dialogue and refused direct French military involvement.
That decision belongs to history, but a question remains: had Bazoum accepted French intervention, would Tiani have succeeded in his coup? No one can rewrite history with certainty, but it is entirely legitimate to note that Tiani benefited from that hesitation. The elected president remained prisoner in the presidential palace while the junta gradually consolidated its control over the state apparatus. The irony is that the one who denounced the French presence in Niger now calls on a foreign power to save his own regime.
Algeria enters the scene
As if the Russian presence were not enough, Algeria has just taken a new step. Following the attempt to overthrow Tiani, Algiers deployed military assets to Niamey, including combat and transport aircraft. This decision marks a significant shift in Algerian doctrine, which had long been marked by reluctance to engage forces beyond its borders. Algeria ultimately did not have to fight the mutineers; they had already been repelled with Russian help. But the message was clear.
Tiani would no longer be alone. Moscow militarily protects the regime. Algiers now provides strategic support. And the junta can present this encirclement as proof that Niger has found new allies. Yet behind this show of force lies a troubling question: how many foreign powers will be needed to protect a government that seems to be gradually losing the support of part of its own army?
A volcano under the barracks
The 29 August mutiny may therefore not be an isolated incident. It could be the first symptom of a much deeper fracture. Russian weapons helped Tiani win a battle, but they have not resolved the frustrations of Nigerien soldiers, destroyed jihadist groups, brought back the dead from the front, or reconciled the troops with the government. They simply allowed the regime to survive its first overthrow attempt.
And that is precisely where the danger lies for Tiani. A regime can control a palace with foreign help, retake a military base, and arrest mutineers. But it cannot indefinitely govern against an army that is beginning to view its own government as dependent on a foreign power. General Tiani should therefore look beyond the walls of his palace. The real danger to his regime may not be in Paris, Washington, or any Western capital he routinely accuses of plotting against him. It could be right there in the Nigerien barracks. If the soldiers who saw their comrades fall to foreign bullets decide one day to settle scores with those they accuse of handing their country to Moscow, the next mutiny could prove far more difficult to contain.
Russians may protect Tiani, and Algeria may support him, but no foreign power can forever replace the loyalty of a national army. Tiani’s regime may have won the battle of 29 August, but it could have lost something far more precious: the trust of some of those who wear the Nigerien uniform.
