The jihadist organisation Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with al-Qaeda, has escalated its blockade around Bamako, Mali’s capital, over the weekend. At least a dozen passenger buses were torched along the critical Ségou-Bamako route, a vital supply artery connecting the east to the capital. Simultaneously, electrical infrastructure linked to the Manantali hydroelectric dam in the Kayes region came under targeted attacks, leaving extensive damage in its wake. While Malian armed forces continue operations across multiple fronts, they have yet to break the economic stranglehold squeezing the nation.
Manantali: a strategic target in a war of attrition
The assault on Manantali’s power lines is far from incidental. The dam, co-managed with Mauritania and Senegal under the Senegal River Basin Development Authority (OMVS), serves as Mali’s primary electricity backbone. By striking these critical nodes, JNIM is no longer merely confronting military forces—it is directly undermining the urban economy, where outages paralyse public services, businesses, and industries in real time.
This escalation follows weeks of systematic targeting of fuel convoys entering Mali from Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. The jihadists aim to weaponise fuel shortages, betting on eroding public trust in the transitional authorities led by General Assimi Goïta. Once relatively insulated from the conflict’s worst effects, Bamako now sits at the heart of a grinding struggle for survival.
Military response and fragile supply respite
The Malian military claims ongoing ground and aerial operations across several regions. Recent weeks have seen military escorts facilitate the arrival of hundreds of fuel tankers in Bamako, easing pressure on gas stations under siege. Yet this reprieve remains tenuous: each convoy demands substantial resources, and securing national highways over the long term appears beyond current capabilities.
The Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) face a dual threat. In central and western Mali, JNIM has intensified ambushes and infrastructure sabotage. Meanwhile, in the north’s Kidal region, tensions simmer in a tense stalemate, with further clashes likely against factions of the Permanent Strategic Framework. Bamako’s leadership is thus navigating two distinct battlegrounds, depleting both human and material reserves.
A regional crisis deepens
The blockade’s ripple effects extend far beyond Mali’s borders. Neighbouring economies, including Senegal, Mauritania, and Côte d’Ivoire, are grappling with the fallout of disrupted trade corridors. Slowdowns in goods flow are straining ports in Dakar and Abidjan, which rely heavily on transit to Mali’s Sahel hinterland. The Sahel States Confederation—comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—has yet to forge a unified response to the jihadist-led economic warfare.
The attack on Manantali also raises urgent questions about shared facilities under OMVS management. Further damage risks cascading effects, jeopardising electricity supplies to Senegal and Mauritania and transforming a Malian crisis into a regional emergency. External partners, from donors to military suppliers, must now weigh supporting Bamako’s sovereignty against safeguarding cross-border critical infrastructure.
The stark contrast between the army’s operational claims and the lived reality of a capital under siege underscores the conflict’s evolving brutality. JNIM is no longer pursuing territorial control alone—it is waging a campaign to suffocate a state at its core.