In Mali, the economic blockade enforced by the JNIM—a jihadist group linked to al-Qaïda—has intensified dramatically over the weekend. At least ten passenger buses were set ablaze along the critical Ségou-Bamako corridor, a vital lifeline for the capital’s supply chain from eastern regions. Simultaneously, electrical infrastructure tied to the Manantali hydroelectric dam in the Kayes region came under targeted assault and was destroyed. While Malian forces continue military operations across multiple fronts, they have yet to break the economic stranglehold gripping the nation.
Manantali: a strategic target in a war of attrition
The deliberate sabotage of Manantali’s infrastructure is far from incidental. Operated under a trilateral agreement with Mauritania and Senegal through the Organisation for the Development of the Senegal River (OMVS), the dam serves as a backbone for Mali’s power grid. By striking its transmission lines, the JNIM is no longer merely challenging state security forces—it is undermining the very backbone of urban life, where power cuts trigger immediate paralysis in public services, commerce, and industry.
This campaign follows weeks of systematic strikes on fuel convoys entering Mali from Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. The jihadists are weaponizing fuel shortages to erode public confidence in the transitional government led by General Assimi Goïta. Bamako, once relatively insulated from the worst of the conflict, now finds itself at the center of a grinding battle for survival.
Military response and fragile supply chains
The Malian army claims to have sustained ground and aerial operations across several regions, with military escorts recently facilitating the entry of hundreds of fuel tankers into Bamako. This temporary relief has eased pressure on gas stations that were besieged by desperate shortages. Yet such logistical gains remain fragile: each convoy demands extensive resources, and the long-term security of national highways appears increasingly unattainable.
Malian armed forces face a dual challenge. In the west and center, the JNIM has escalated ambushes and infrastructure attacks. Meanwhile, in the north, the Kidal region remains locked in a tense stalemate, with further clashes likely against rebel factions of the Permanent Strategic Framework. The government in Bamako is now managing two distinct fronts, with dwindling human and material resources.
A regional crisis deepens
The blockade’s ripple effects extend well beyond Mali’s borders. Neighboring economies—Senegal, Mauritania, and Côte d’Ivoire—are growing increasingly concerned as West African trade corridors deteriorate. The slowdown in goods movement is straining ports in Dakar and Abidjan, where a significant share of cargo traditionally transits toward Sahelian hinterlands. The Sahel States Confederation, comprising Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, has yet to forge a unified response to the economic warfare waged by jihadist groups.
The assault on Manantali also raises urgent questions about shared infrastructure under the OMVS framework. Further damage could directly disrupt electricity supplies to Senegal and Mauritania, transforming a Malian crisis into a regional emergency. External partners—whether development donors or military suppliers—must now weigh their support for Bamako’s sovereignty against the need to protect transboundary critical infrastructure.
On the ground, the gap between the army’s operational claims and the harsh reality of a capital under siege underscores the unprecedented nature of this conflict phase. The JNIM is no longer content with territorial control—it is waging a campaign to suffocate the state itself.
