An economist’s critical look at Cameroon’s political dynamics
With Cameroon’s crucial 2027 dual elections on the horizon, economist Serge Alain Godong presents an unvarnished interpretation of the nation’s political face-off. His analysis delves into the strategic intricacies shaping the electoral contest.
Drawing on the principles of “game theory” and the “prisoner’s dilemma,” Godong elucidates why, in his expert opinion, Maurice Kamto faced an insurmountable challenge in 2018 and is likely to encounter significant hurdles in the upcoming electoral cycle. In a comprehensive document, Godong characterizes the existing regime as “openly twilight” and describes an electorate that consistently gravitates towards the perceived certainty of the familiar rather than embracing the uncertain promises of change.
“The overtly twilight nature of the four-decade-old regime in power more than ever compels us to consider the dynamics of consolidation or change at play within the Cameroonian public sphere,” asserts Serge Alain Godong, an economist with distinguished qualifications from Sciences-Po Paris, EHESS, and Paris X, in his insightful analysis. For Godong, the pivotal moment was the 2018 election. He recalls, “The astonishment gradually subsided regarding the ‘penalty scored’ that Mr. Kamto Maurice had publicly claimed to have taken.” Following that election, Paul Biya was sworn into office, the MRC party saw its influence curtailed, and a significant portion of the Cameroonian populace “acknowledged the tranquil continuation of his tenure on the comfortable seat of Etoudi.”
Godong constructs his argument upon the foundational tenets of “game theory.” He posits two core assumptions: first, that “humans are fundamentally rational calculators,” and second, that “they require information” to safeguard their potential gains. Within this framework, an election is redefined as “a specific juncture where an individual proposes a form of contract about the future to a national community.”
However, Godong suggests that Kamto is currently unable to offer a more compelling or credible contract than the one already established by the incumbent leadership. He argues, “The approximately 8.5 million Cameroonian voters expected to cast their ballots next year would only entrust their votes to Mr. Kamto Maurice if they are absolutely convinced that he will, in the coming years, better secure their interests than Mr. Biya Paul.”
The economist identifies an estimated 16 million current “winners” within Cameroon. This demographic includes civil servants, employees in the formal private sector, liberal professionals, and their extended families. “It can therefore be estimated that some 1,500 billion F. CFA are distributed annually […] among the approximately 16 million Cameroonians who belong to these winners.” These individuals benefit directly from the national payroll, public procurement contracts, and major infrastructure projects. “It is these Cameroonians and their close associates who will undoubtedly vote for the RDPC and its candidate, with full awareness of their choice.”
This situation, Godong explains, leads to a “prisoner’s dilemma.” In the absence of coordinated information and tangible proof of a superior outcome, voters invariably opt for the status quo. “Cameroonians are therefore perfectly aware that the current situation is rather disadvantageous; yet many among them distinctly prefer it to a presumptively superior equilibrium position, about which they can say nothing with certainty.”
The analysis then transitions to what Godong terms the “Bamiléké problem.” Citing Meredith Terretta, he highlights the historical distinction between “gung” (territory) and “lepue” (freedom). From this, he suggests, stems an “economic and social Darwinism” often attributed to individuals originating from the Grassfields region. Consequently, “Mr. Kamto is not viewed through the ordinary lens of a person offering an alternative political proposal […] but rather as a kind of malevolent avatar sent to execute a diabolical plan.”
Godong further describes a “syndrome” distinct from Stockholm Syndrome. He illustrates a pervasive system of “eating together,” where “everyone is connected to everyone else through a minor scheme; each person takes from their neighbor.” This model defines “winners as simply those who ‘eat,’ and losers as those who are hungry.”
Godong’s ultimate conclusion is that any future victor, regardless of identity, “will have no choice but to act swiftly and decisively.” Swift action will be required for redistribution, and strong measures will be necessary to elevate the economy as the sole “battleground.” Achieving a 6% growth rate, reducing the national deficit, and vigorously combating corruption are all identified as “serious and urgent” imperatives.
Ultimately, the analyst predicts that the political arena “will become progressively less complacent, less rent-seeking.” He also posits that the nation requires “a strong and committed Paul Biya” to effectively manage the post-electoral period.
