After three years of relentless conflict, the war in Sudan has now spilled across borders into Chad. Cross-border strikes, rising military tensions, and escalating communal clashes are forcing N’Djamena to confront a crisis it can no longer ignore.

Since April 2023, Sudan has been torn apart by a brutal war between General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, widely known as Hemedti. Despite Chad’s official stance of neutrality, its government has quietly backed the RSF—support that now threatens to backfire. This contradictory position places Chad in a precarious position: supporting a force that has been accused of attacking Zaghawa communities in Darfur, a group that holds significant influence within Chad’s own state apparatus. Arms shipments, reportedly funded by the United Arab Emirates, have reportedly passed through key border towns such as Amdjarass and Adré. A high-risk strategy whose consequences, though predictable, are now unfolding with alarming speed.

Tiné: the flashpoint on Chad’s border

Tiné is not just one town—it’s two. One lies in Sudan, the other in Chad, and both are home to the same Zaghawa communities. These twin border towns serve as a critical crossing point for civilians fleeing the horrors of Darfur’s northern regions, seeking refuge in Chad.

On February 21, 2026, the RSF seized control of the Sudanese side of Tiné. Almost immediately, they faced resistance from the Toroboros—Chadian and Sudanese fighters allied with General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan—and from Chadian soldiers operating without official orders. Within days, the town was retaken. In response to the growing instability, Chad announced the closure of the border. Yet violence continued unabated, confirming that this conflict was no longer confined to Sudan—it had taken root in Chad’s borderlands.

The crisis deepened on March 21, when a deadly drone strike hit Tiné in Chad, killing at least twenty civilians. Chadian authorities have denied any involvement, but skepticism runs deep. Exiled opposition leader Ousmane Dillo, currently based in Sudan, accused President Mahamat Déby in a widely circulated audio message, going so far as to call for his removal. He also warned that Déby’s policies were endangering the entire Zaghawa community. Across the border, Minni Arkou Minawi, Governor of Darfur, escalated tensions by declaring that “the war with Chad has already begun.” His statement signaled a dangerous regional escalation.

Chad on high alert

Chad’s leadership has responded with defiance. Government spokesperson Gassim Chérif Mahamat reaffirmed Chad’s neutrality while warning of a “measured retaliation” against any attacks. Hours later, President Mahamat Déby ordered the armed forces onto maximum alert. On March 22, a high-level security summit convened in Tiné, assembling top military officials to reinforce border security and prevent further destabilization. “This is Tiné, Chad—not Tiné, Sudan. Let the Sudanese army, the Toroboros, and the RSF fight it out in their own country. They must not bring their war here to kill our people,” declared General Ali Ahmat Akhabach, Minister of Security.

Days later, N’Djamena took an even more drastic step: it banned all crossings at the border, blocking women and children fleeing Sudan’s war from reaching safety in Chad’s refugee camps. While framed as a measure to prevent rebellion within the Zaghawa community, the decision carries severe humanitarian consequences. According to regional analyst Cameron Hudson, “Chad’s military buildup along the Sudanese border, far from easing tensions, risks pulling Chad deeper into the Sudanese conflict. By projecting an image of strength, Déby may be making a grave strategic miscalculation.”

Communal tensions fueled by the cross-border war

The conflict’s ripple effects extend beyond the Zaghawa. According to Chadian security sources, the RSF has been actively recruiting young men from the Tama community—long-standing rivals of the Zaghawa. This recruitment, disguised as mercenary work, relies on local networks involving traditional leaders, administrative authorities, and figures close to the government.

Like the Zaghawa, the Tama are a transnational community, straddling eastern Chad (Wadi Fira, Ouaddaï) and western Sudan. Despite not being Arab, during the 2003 Darfur war, the Tama were integrated into the Janjaweed militias—the forerunners of Hemedti’s forces—and participated in attacks against ethnic groups, including the Zaghawa. This resurgence of old wounds is deeply concerning: it risks reopening deep societal fractures and fueling intercommunal fear within Chad.

What was once a calculated gamble by Chad now appears to be spiraling out of control. The border, once a line of separation, has become a battleground where Sudan’s war is being waged on Chadian soil. Chad’s ambiguous strategy has led to a dangerous entanglement—and once unleashed, the genie cannot be put back in the bottle.