As Mali faces increasing instability, its regional partners appear to be looking elsewhere. Neither the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) — intended to forge a collective security response among Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger — nor ECOWAS, from which Bamako withdrew, seem capable of exerting significant influence. Amidst strategic silences, perfunctory condemnations, and political calculations, West Africa conveys a sense of strategic vacuum. Bakary Sambe, president of the Timbuktu Institute and a research professor at Gaston-Berger University in Saint-Louis, offers insights into a period reshaping West African security dynamics.
Following the April 25th attacks, what is the current understanding of the situation in Mali?
Bakary Sambe: The coordinated attack was severe, particularly in Kati, where Defense Minister Sadio Camara died, now succeeded by General Assimi Goïta himself. However, at this juncture, I believe it’s premature to discuss a potential regime change or the fall of Bamako. Life continues as best it can, and Malians, long accustomed to crises, are once again demonstrating their resilience. This persists despite the ongoing war of communiqués between military authorities, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), and the JNIM.
What concrete actions are Burkina Faso and Niger, Mali’s allies in the AES, taking?
Captain Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso officially denounced a “monstrous conspiracy.” While some might deem this reaction subdued, Ouagadougou’s stance is primarily realistic. Burkina Faso remains deeply engrossed in its own internal security challenges, explaining its limited external engagement. Just last week, numerous soldiers lost their lives in attacks on Burkinabè soil. During the fuel blockade in Mali at the end of 2025, Burkina Faso did offer logistical aid until its own front became too difficult to manage.
Legally, Articles 5 and 6 of the Liptako-Gourma Charter, which solidifies the alliance between these three Sahelian nations, are often likened to NATO’s principle of mutual assistance. This framework is quite explicit. However, for both Burkina Faso and Niger, domestic security threats restrict their capacity for implementation. On paper, the AES functions as a confederation that has yet to achieve strategic maturity, particularly regarding its ability to pool forces. This week, Nigerien authorities reluctantly declared a national day of “fasting” and prayers against terrorism.
The Malian crisis exposes the limitations of regional alliances.
ECOWAS has called for “regional mobilization,” but what is its objective, especially since Bamako left the organization in January 2025?
This declaration must be understood within the recent regional context. It follows a significant meeting focused on the Sahel, hosted in Lomé, Togo. For the first time in years, ministers from AES countries, alongside representatives from ECOWAS, the African Union, France, the European Union, and Russia, convened at the same table.
Beyond the immediate crisis in Mali, it’s crucial not to overlook diplomatic efforts aimed at counteracting regional fragmentation and the escalating security situation of recent years. In this context, ECOWAS seeks to project a new image, distancing itself from its previous attempt at military intervention in Niger.
At the Lomé meeting, Mali’s Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop affirmed that avenues for dialogue and exchange remain open, strictly within the framework of respecting the sovereignty of Sahel states. Through these overtures, ECOWAS intends to gradually re-engage in the Sahelian arena.
The African Union, for its part, emphasizes the importance of “continental mechanisms” to prevent further security destabilization in the Central Sahel. What does the continental organization refer to?
Once again, the formation of the AES, with its Liptako-Gourma Charter, has somewhat disrupted the regional security framework. This framework, however, had never been particularly effective in counter-terrorism efforts. The simple reason is that for over a decade, regional organizations were largely sidelined on security matters, with a clear prioritization of the G5 Sahel, which was dissolved in 2023.
Despite their historical detachment from Sahelian security operations, the African Union and ECOWAS continue to pursue the ideal of an intervention force, or at least a joint force. Yet, this ambition struggles to materialize on the ground. By the end of 2026, ECOWAS plans to deploy an anti-terrorism brigade of 1,650 personnel, but a broader armed or peacekeeping mission remains highly uncertain for now.
Regardless, there’s a growing awareness that attempting to separate the Central Sahel from West Africa in the fight against armed groups is a strategic misstep. When faced with divisive issues, security must be managed collaboratively through intelligence sharing and resource pooling. The shock of April 25th has brought the indispensable need for security cooperation, even minimal, back to the forefront.
Russia faces a strategic rout.
Indeed, another actor that has increased visits to the Sahel in recent months is Washington. What stance might the United States be inclined to adopt in response to the Malian crisis?
Beyond Donald Trump’s relative disinterest in Africa, we are observing a renewed focus from American diplomacy, with high-ranking officials returning to the Sahel, even in Niger where US military personnel had been expelled. This shift is simply because the stakes have changed.
Furthermore, the situation in Mali highlights a comprehensive defeat for Russia, most starkly demonstrated by the death of Defense Minister Sadio Camara. He was widely regarded as the most Russophile among the military figures who rose to power in Mali. The departure of Africa Corps paramilitaries from Kidal serves as another powerful indicator.
The russian influence Sahel failure is not solely military; it is profoundly symbolic. A myth has crumbled: that of Russia’s ability to guarantee the protection and security of regimes. This could significantly damage Moscow’s diplomatic and security standing.
Conversely, if the United States believes it can challenge, or even dislodge, Russia from the Sahel, I think Washington will find geopolitical and diplomatic justifications to establish a more pronounced presence in the region, particularly in Mali, with resource considerations as an underlying factor.
Does the Malian crisis now threaten the countries of the Gulf of Guinea?
For coastal nations, it is primarily the dynamics within Burkina Faso that concern the central authorities of Togo, Benin, Ghana, or Côte d’Ivoire. Currently, if the Malian security situation were to worsen, the repercussions would be felt more keenly in Senegal or Mauritania. Consequently, all eyes are on Ouagadougou. The fear of a Sahelian domino effect is highly relevant, as is the questioning of the future and institutional viability of the AES. Populations are seeking concrete answers beyond mere rhetoric.
In the interim, Togo is endeavoring to forge a new “bridge with the Sahel,” to quote the Togolese Foreign Minister Robert Dussey. It remains to be seen, over time, what this ambition will encompass.
The Sahel cannot be isolated from West Africa.
Should we fear a domino effect after these attacks, particularly in Burkina Faso?
The Malian case is unique; to assume such an attack would replicate elsewhere would be premature. Crucially, the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) does not operate in Burkina Faso. In Mali, the trigger involves a confluence of deep-seated security crises in the North and political instability in Bamako.
Paradoxically, the severity of these attacks could generate a form of political advantage for the incumbent authorities. This is because whenever the issue of the North becomes critical or highly visible, it galvanizes the Malian population around its army, fostering a sense of territorial integrity. Rallying around the flag has never been stronger in Bamako in recent days, to the extent that it chills any dissenting voices, which, in the current climate, would be perceived as counter to the prevailing patriotism. The authorities no longer even require inspiring communication.
To revisit the domino effect, despite vast territories in Burkina Faso being outside Ouagadougou’s central control, there are currently no influential protest movements capable of bolstering JNIM jihadists and destabilizing Burkina Faso on such a broad scale.
