A pledge of reform gives way to insider dealings
Eighteen months after the power seizure in Niamey on July 26, 2023, the promises of a national “Refondation” and a clean break with the past are crumbling against the realities of petroleum management. At the heart of the government, the newly appointed Minister of Petroleum, Hamadou Tini, faces accusations of wearing multiple hats in defiance of the most basic ethical standards. Acting as both judge and jury, the former Mazars executive is now leveraging state power to revive contracts for his private firm, demanding complete access to the secrets of the Zinder Refining Company (SORAZ). This is an investigation into a conflict of interest at the highest level of state, where financial auditing has become a tool for purges and personal gain.
Following their takeover, the military leaders of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP) made economic sovereignty their rallying cry. Their primary target was clear: the management of oil resources, specifically SORAZ. State television broadcast propaganda denouncing the ousted democratic system and its international “accomplices.”
Among those singled out was the international consulting firm Mazars, a partner of the Nigerien state for a decade, which was unceremoniously dismissed. Accused by the new regime and its Chinese partners at the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) of producing skewed audits, Mazars appeared to be permanently exiled from Niger’s economic landscape. The official position was uncompromising: Niamey would hire a neutral, independent, and untainted international firm to meticulously examine SORAZ’s books.
Behind the scenes, however, the influence of established networks quickly tempered public optimism. Through intense lobbying, one of Mazars’ own senior executives managed to embed himself within the state apparatus. In January 2026, with the direct backing of General Mody, chartered accountant Hamadou Tini was appointed to lead the Ministry of Petroleum. His nomination signaled the grand return of the very firm he had served just weeks before.
Minister Tini: client, provider, and paymaster
Barely settled into his ministerial role, Hamadou Tini put a new spin on the old adage that charity begins at home. Wielding the authority of his office, the minister immediately reinstated the financial and management audit of SORAZ. But this move came with a non-negotiable term: the highly strategic mission had to be awarded to his own former firm, Mazars, ostensibly to allow it to “finalize its work and get paid.”
This contractual reactivation stretches the concept of conflict of interest to an unprecedented level. The Minister of Petroleum is simultaneously the client ordering the audit on behalf of the Nigerien state, the service provider carrying out the mission through his former firm Mazars, the final recipient of the audit reports, and the sole signatory on the public checks that pay for the service.
This convergence of roles strips the Nigerien state of any guarantee of independence. How can a firm audit a public company objectively when its own mentor and former senior executive is the supervising minister?
An ultimatum for confidential documents
The power play extends beyond contract signatures. With the transition’s future uncertain, time is of the essence for Tini’s circle. The minister has just issued a direct and non-negotiable order to SORAZ’s management.
Through a ministerial directive, Hamadou Tini demands that Mazars be provided with “all financial, accounting, technical, and operational documents, without delay or restriction, within eight days.” This includes the precise strategic and confidential data that the refinery’s management and its Chinese partners had stubbornly withheld in the past to protect trade secrets.
In Niamey, local observers use another popular saying to describe the situation: “He who has peeked through the keyhole already knows what is on the table.” Having intimate knowledge of SORAZ’s accounting vulnerabilities from his previous position, the minister knows exactly where to look to get what he wants.
The mystery of the dismissed ministers
This aggressive takeover of the SORAZ file sheds new light on the chronic instability within the Ministry of Petroleum since the coup. In three years, three different ministers have occupied this strategic post. This game of musical chairs appears to be closely tied to the secrets held within the Zinder refinery.
Before Hamadou Tini’s arrival, Minister Mahaman Moustapha Barké had announced with great fanfare in June 2024 the launch of a comprehensive financial audit of SORAZ. A few months later, on January 13, 2025, he was arrested and held by the General Directorate of Documentation and External Security (DGDSE). He was detained incommunicado for nearly a year, outside of any legal process, until his release on January 6, 2026. His successor, Dr. Sahabi Oumarou, appointed in the interim, also attempted to restart the audit in February 2025 before being swiftly removed from his position.
Consistent sources within the sector now accuse Hamadou Tini of playing an active role in his predecessors’ downfall. While still an expert at Mazars, he allegedly drafted damning and cleverly slanted memos and reports to discredit the management of Barké and Oumarou in the eyes of the junta. The twofold objective was to clear the path for Mazars’ return and to create a vacancy for a tailor-made candidate: himself.
A “Refondation” on life support
The SORAZ affair highlights the deep contradictions of the Niamey regime. As the people of Niger bear the full economic consequences of diplomatic isolation and await the promised benefits of their oil wealth, the nation’s black gold seems to primarily serve corporate interests.
The SORAZ audit, initially demanded by civil society as an act of transparency and public accountability, has devolved into an instrument of clan warfare. In the hands of the minister-auditor, it serves as both a shield to conceal conflicts of interest and a cash drawer for his former firm. For the “Refondation” promised by the CNSP, the diagnosis is grim: the methods of managing Niger’s oil have not changed, only the beneficiaries have.
