Despite regime changes and radical geopolitical shifts, Niamey remains trapped in a war of attrition. From Mahamadou Issoufou’s Western alliance strategy to Abdourahamane Tiani’s sovereignist break, the harsh reality stays the same: on the ground, the terrorist threat does not retreat.
Three presidents, two democratic transitions, one coup d’état, and one constant: bloodshed in the ‘three borders’ zone and the Lake Chad basin. In Niger, governments come and go, but the jihadist hydra—represented by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (EIGS) and the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (GSIM)—endures.
While the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP), in power since July 2023, vowed to restore security by sending Western partners away, the country now faces a sobering reality check. It is time to assess a war that, for now, seems unwinnable.
The Issoufou-Bazoum era: The illusion of the Western shield
Under President Mahamadou Issoufou (2011–2021), Niger chose to position itself as the linchpin of Western strategy in the Sahel. As the Malian state crumbled nearby, Niamey became the military hub for France (Operation Barkhane) and the United States (Agadez drone base).
His successor, Mohamed Bazoum, attempted to add a layer of political flexibility:
- A ‘hand extended’ approach by initiating dialogue with some former fighters.
- A major investment in training Nigerien special forces.
The downside: While this strategy prevented the country’s collapse, it never managed to eliminate the threat. Worse, the presence of foreign troops fueled deep frustration within parts of the army and the population, who saw it as a loss of sovereignty for results deemed insufficient.
Tiani’s wager: Sovereignty under fire
By overthrowing Mohamed Bazoum on July 26, 2023, General Abdourahamane Tiani and the CNSP justified their power grab by citing ‘the continued deterioration of the security situation.’ What followed is well known: a sharp break with Paris and Washington, the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with Mali and Burkina Faso, and a strategic rapprochement with Russia (via the Africa Corps) and Turkey.
In terms of communication, the shift is radical. The military leadership celebrates national pride and promises a purely military response, free from Western ‘hidden agendas.’
The harsh reality on the ground
Yet, reports from UN observers and strategic research centers agree: the departure of Western forces left an immediate capability gap, particularly in aerial intelligence and technological surveillance.
Complex attacks are increasing, sometimes targeting entire Nigerien army (FDS) garrisons and causing heavy losses. The subsequent economic blockade in some regions and diplomatic isolation complicate the logistical funding of a war that costs millions of dollars daily.
Why is Niger stuck in this deadlock?
The common mistake of successive regimes—whether civilian or military—lies in treating a crisis that is primarily political and social as a purely military one. Two major approaches have failed:
On one side, the Issoufou-Bazoum doctrine bet everything on integration into the international security architecture. Its main weakness was excessive external dependence, disconnected from popular aspirations, making the French narrative inaudible to much of Nigerien public opinion.
On the other side, the Tiani doctrine favors a total geopolitical rupture and a martial sovereignty embodied by the AES. The limits of this formula are already visible on the ground: an immediate loss of advanced technological intelligence, suffocating financial isolation, and, paradoxically, an escalation of violence by armed groups exploiting regional disorganization.
In both cases, the roots of the problem remain unchanged: the absence of the state in peripheral areas, the lack of economic prospects for rural youth, and inter-community conflicts (notably between herders and farmers) that jihadist groups skillfully exploit for recruitment.
Whether waged under the banner of international cooperation or AES sovereignty, the war in Niger cannot be won by weapons alone. For General Tiani, the challenge is no longer just to criticize his predecessors’ record but to prove that the current military formula can protect Nigeriens. Without a massive reintroduction of public services (schools, justice, clinics) in insecure zones, Niger risks eventually losing this war for good.
