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Mali rebel offensive: political negotiation on the horizon?
In Mali, the military junta led by Assimi Goïta, aligned with Russian interests, faces unprecedented pressure following a major offensive launched on April 25 by jihadists from the JNIM (Al-Qaeda affiliate) and separatists from the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA). Northern Mali risks falling under rebel control, echoing the 2012 crisis when a similar coalition seized power. While France’s Barkhane operation once intervened, today’s context differs significantly. What are the rebels’ goals, and how might Russia respond? How should European nations prepare for the emergence of a new jihadist proto-state in Mali? This analysis examines the humanitarian risks and the deepening fragmentation of the Sahel region.
On April 25, 2026, a coordinated military assault unfolded across Mali as jihadist fighters from the JNIM (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims) and Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) militants launched a sweeping offensive against Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) and their Russian Wagner Group allies. The attack has plunged Bamako into a new cycle of instability, reviving memories of the 2012 crisis when a comparable coalition seized control of northern Mali under vastly different political conditions.
How does the current crisis compare to 2012? What short-term outcomes can be expected from this offensive?
The unfolding crisis: a historic offensive
On April 25, 2026, rebel forces targeted five key Malian cities: Bamako, Kidal, Gao, Sévaré, and Mopti. This marks the first time since March 2012 that jihadist and separatist factions have launched a joint operation of such scale. What began as sporadic coordination in 2024 has evolved into a full-fledged alliance. The assault focused on FAMa and Wagner positions, with symbolic sites in Bamako—including Kati’s military district and the airport—coming under fire.
A preliminary assessment reveals the following developments, though the situation remains fluid:
- Northern cities have fallen under rebel and jihadist control. Kidal, along with nearby towns like Tessalit and Anéfis, has been overrun. Other key locations—Ber, Bourem, Gourma-Rharous, Léré, Intahaka, and Tessit—have also been seized, encircling Gao and Tombouctou. However, critical military bases in these cities remain contested, including those held by Malian and Russian forces in Gao, Tombouctou, and Aguelhok.
- The junta leadership has been directly hit. Defense Minister General Sadio Camara was killed, while Security Agency chief General Modibo Koné sustained injuries. President Assimi Goïta, the military leader, was reportedly evacuated to Turkey’s embassy before resurfacing publicly on April 28 alongside Russian officials.
- Rumors of a counter-coup by General Malick Diaw, another junta figurehead, circulated but remain unconfirmed. One certainty stands: the junta’s command structure has been severely disrupted by the attack.
Though this offensive mirrors 2012’s events, key differences set it apart:
- JNIM and FLA are coordinating openly, with JNIM leaders allowing FLA spokespeople to take the lead. Unlike 2012, when jihadist leaders like Iyad ag Ghali and Hamadoun Kouffa remained in the shadows, only FLA commander Sidan Ag Hitta has been spotted in Tessalit.
- Rather than executing captured soldiers as in 2012, both groups prioritize negotiated surrender, allowing FAMa troops to retreat before urging others to lay down arms. Their messaging frames them as protectors of both civilians and soldiers against Bamako’s junta.
- Negotiations secured the withdrawal of Russian mercenaries from northern bases without resistance, mirroring tactics used in Syria. Algeria likely facilitated these talks, possibly in coordination with the FLA.
- The northern advance relied on diverting FAMa forces to central and southern fronts. The prolonged assault on Bamako itself represents an unprecedented escalation.
Negotiations secured the withdrawal of Russian mercenaries from northern bases without resistance, mirroring tactics used in Syria.
This offensive underscores a strategic shift: both armed groups have adapted their approaches, learning from past failures and victories since 2012. Rather than seizing territory outright, they now focus on strangulating urban centers and the junta—a strategy employed since 2020. By April 28, the JNIM had announced a total blockade of Bamako, burning supply trucks to demonstrate resolve while the junta organizes limited convoy escorts.
Unlike 2012-2013, the regime, FAMa, and their Russian allies have not collapsed entirely, instead launching counter-offensives. Though Bamako’s situation is dire, it remains far from fatal. Civil society voices have renewed calls for negotiations with armed groups, criticizing the junta’s military-only strategy. Figures like politician Oumar Mariko, former minister Mamadou Ismaïla Konaté, imam Mahmoud Dicko, and the Brussels-based Sahel Democrats Alliance have amplified these demands.
Amid this upheaval, the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (EIWS) attacked Ménaka but was repelled by Russo-Malian forces. Though EIWS did not participate in the JNIM-FLA offensive, it remains a persistent threat in northeastern Mali.
An anticipated crisis
In a September 2022 analysis, we warned that Russian military support would prove illusory, failing to address Mali’s security challenges due to its counterproductive nature. Far from stabilizing the region, Moscow’s intervention served to prop up the junta and advance its Sahel States Alliance (AES) agenda. Since then, Russian tactics—marked by civilian repression—have failed to curb JNIM’s expansion.
- In January 2023, a foresight exercise predicted scenarios unfolding today, including:
“Rising tensions between the CMA and FAMa/Wagner will reignite armed clashes in the North, with the CMA objectively allied to JNIM to reclaim full control of the Niger River loop and potentially half of Mali.” - “The fragmentation of central Mali will fuel recurring conflicts between the Macina Katibat and community militias, with the latter likely unable to prevail. JNIM will progressively dominate the region.”
- “Bamako’s outskirts will face encirclement […] unless the army collapses entirely, the capital itself is unlikely to fall as it did in 2012.”
- “Loss of control over Mali will trigger political tensions, culminating in negotiations with JNIM to establish a lasting truce. This could result in territorial concessions or constitutional changes, with religious institutions pressuring the government to negotiate.”
By November 2023, after FAMa and Wagner retook Kidal, we cautioned that this victory was a mirage. The CMA had strategically retreated to regroup for a future counter-offensive, a process culminating in the recent conquests.
These insights confirm the crisis was foreseeable. With this foundation, we can explore likely short-term developments.
Short-term outlook
Militarily, the JNIM-FLA coalition will likely negotiate Russian withdrawals from the North before seizing Gao and Tombouctou, effectively partitioning Mali as in 2012. That year, the pattern unfolded in phases: Kidal fell first, followed by simultaneous assaults on Gao and Tombouctou. Mass desertions by Malian troops hastened the collapse—conditions that may recur given the junta’s fractured command structure and political turmoil in Bamako. If Russian forces withdraw from northern strongholds, Gao, Tombouctou, and the Niger River loop will almost certainly fall.
The only variable that could delay rebel conquest is the threat posed by Malian and Burkinabe TB2 drones. While JNIM-FLA may destroy Malian drones, kamikaze drones targeting airfields pose a greater challenge. Burkinabe and Nigerien drones, however, remain harder to neutralize.
The North’s gradual fall to FLA and JNIM appears inevitable, particularly as both groups have moderated their objectives. The FLA seeks de facto autonomy without full political independence, while JNIM appears willing to implement a less rigid version of Islamic law. This reduces the likelihood of a 2012-style scenario where jihadists imposed brutal governance after clashing with Arab-Tuareg allies. Recall that AQMI’s failure in 2013 led its leaders to advocate a softer expansion strategy, prioritizing proselytization over total control.
Controlling northern Mali will position these groups favorably but also open new fronts. They must contend with ISIS in Ménaka and potential airstrikes by Malian, Burkinabe, or Nigerien forces. Unlike 2012, JNIM fighters are also active in central Mali, where renewed attacks on FAMa garrisons in Gossi, Boni, Hombori, and other towns are likely. These operations aim to break Malian defenses without necessarily occupying cities, as seen in recent reprisals against villages like Kori-Kori and Gomossogou. Such violence risks undermining JNIM’s broader political strategy of positioning itself as a protector against junta brutality.
The fate of central and southern Mali remains uncertain for two reasons. First, JNIM has controlled rural areas for years, besieging cities and negotiating local agreements with communities in exchange for Islamic law implementation—a strategy reminiscent of the Viet Cong or Taliban. Second, unlike the Taliban, JNIM lacks the manpower to sustain broad territorial control.
However, the 2012 capture of Kidal, Gao, and Tombouctou enabled massive recruitment, particularly in central Mali. A repeat of this strategy could significantly strengthen JNIM.
The siege of Bamako reflects a strategy to suffocate the junta, either forcing regime change or coercing negotiations.
The siege of Bamako reflects a strategy to suffocate the junta, either forcing regime change or coercing negotiations. Despite junta propaganda, the scale of this offensive—just months after the capital’s first successful siege—exposes Assimi Goïta’s vulnerability. Trapped in Bamako like Bashar al-Assad in Damascus, the junta’s foundations are weakening. Key architects of the Russian partnership, Sadio Camara and Modibo Koné, are sidelined, and Goïta’s growing distrust of Moscow may prompt a reevaluation. The Russian alliance could unravel, accelerating the loss of northern and central Mali. Ongoing negotiations and months of FAMa-Russian tensions—exacerbated by defeats like Tinzawatene—further destabilize the partnership.
Absent external pressure, the junta has little incentive to abandon its Russian alliance if it hopes to survive. Continued payments to Wagner may secure Bamako’s defense, but territorial recovery seems improbable. If Russia withdraws support, Mali will rely on limited help from Burkina Faso and Niger, both mired in their own jihadist conflicts. Senegal may mobilize at its border but is unlikely to deploy troops amid JNIM’s growing presence. Algeria, Mauritania, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire are likely to observe from the sidelines, privately welcoming the junta’s humiliation while pushing for negotiations.
Prospectively:
- Long-term trends since 2022 indicate northern Mali’s fall is inevitable, with central Mali following suit. The timeline is uncertain, but the balance of power is clear.
- The Russian partnership is fragile and doomed to fail, as is Bamako’s military strategy—a reality underscored by recent events.
- Two potential turning points:
– Negotiations, either due to junta collapse or diplomatic pressure.
– External military intervention to reverse the balance of power.
What future for Mali and the international community?
In this context, several—non-exclusive—scenarios are likely:
Scenario 1: The prospect of external military intervention
What action will be taken when JNIM raises its black flag over a major Malian city?
This crisis forces a critical question: what will the international community do when JNIM raises its black flag over a major Malian city? Before 2022, such a move would have triggered Western military intervention (Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Mali) to dismantle jihadist networks. However, withdrawals from Afghanistan and the Sahel demand a reassessment. Is regional or international military intervention desirable, feasible, or realistic? Regionally, only Algeria possesses the capability to shift the balance of power—but its non-intervention doctrine and current role in the crisis make this unlikely. Mauritania has maintained a non-aggression pact with AQMI and JNIM since 2010. Other regional armies have struggled against jihadists, limiting their options to defensive postures. Thus, only an international intervention could reverse the tide, akin to the temporary solution provided by Barkhane. France, the UN, and the EU lack the appetite for renewed Sahel deployments, while the U.S. prioritizes other theaters. Negotiations emerge as the most plausible path forward.
Scenario 2: The prospect of comprehensive political negotiations
Since 2025, JNIM leaders have pursued the same victory model as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, embracing a more ‘moderate’ Islamic governance approach and engaging in dialogue with international actors. To achieve this, JNIM has sought a sponsor since 2024, potentially Algeria or Mauritania—both of which maintain close ties with FLA leaders, engage with JNIM cadres, and oppose Bamako’s junta. Will either country accept this role?
This strategy anticipates a junta collapse followed by negotiations with a political force willing to accept JNIM’s demands: implementation of Islamic law nationwide, greater autonomy for northern and central regions, and integration of JNIM and FLA into local governance.
Yet critical challenges persist. Unlike HTS, JNIM has not severed its allegiance to Al-Qaeda, nor does it renounce exporting its jihadist ideology beyond Mali’s borders. Moreover, JNIM’s lack of official dialogue with the international community complicates its normalization. Can JNIM be an acceptable negotiation partner for regional powers and possibly European actors? The current political framework suggests otherwise.
A comprehensive negotiation would require engaging both the FLA—building on the Algiers Accords—and JNIM, leveraging local agreements with the High Islamic Council of Mali. Progress hinges on pressure from Russian, Turkish, or African partners (e.g., Togo, Ghana) against the junta. Without such pressure, Malian forces are unlikely to regain control through military means. While Bamako’s blockade may spark civil society mobilization or a counter-coup, systematic repression since 2020 makes this improbable. Until negotiations begin, the strangulation strategy will persist, with captured cities serving as launchpads for further attacks.
