In recent weeks, diplomatic initiatives have multiplied across West Africa, aiming to rebuild bridges between ECOWAS member states and those of the Alliance of Sahel States (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger). At the heart of these delicate efforts lies the urgent security situation and the need for coordinated policies to eventually pool resources. To give this emergency diplomacy a real chance, all actors must follow some unwritten rules: set aside the dispute over the three AES countries’ withdrawal from ECOWAS, overlook the hostility generated by AES regimes’ propaganda campaigns against certain neighbouring states, and move beyond the geopolitical restructuring in the Sahel that has created a “cold war” climate between the two blocs. In short, it means silencing grudges, overcoming tensions and inappropriate displays of pride, to face the common challenges of the moment.
Côte d’Ivoire “ready to resume cooperation”
A strong signal of this shift came from Ivorian Defence Minister Tene Birahima Ouattara. On 15 June, he stated he was “sincerely ready to resume security cooperation” with Mali and Burkina Faso, stressing that “terrorism, as it presents itself today, cannot be defeated by one state alone. Collaboration and pooling of forces are essential.” This obvious point is worth repeating, as some decision-makers warn that the consequences of the Sahel security crisis “could become untenable in the medium term” for the entire region.
How will Mali and Burkina Faso respond to Côte d’Ivoire’s call? For now, there is no guarantee of a collective surge of lucidity from all concerned to work together on solutions to the pressing issues. While Malian and Burkinabe leaders acknowledge that the break with ECOWAS “does not exclude bilateral cooperation”, it remains difficult for them to suddenly change their stance towards the Ivorian interlocutor. Regularly accused of harbouring terrorist elements “financed” or “sponsored” by “French imperialism”, Côte d’Ivoire is a prime target in the AES’s narrative of external enemies—often imaginary ones. Although these accusations have never been backed by facts or evidence, they are part of the doctrinaire discourse of regimes born from coups that led to their ECOWAS withdrawal. Yet, despite these poisonous diplomatic relations, Côte d’Ivoire maintains discreet channels of exchange and cooperation with Mali and Burkina Faso, whose nationals enjoy refugee status by the thousands on Ivorian soil.
“New era” for Benin and Niger
Benin, also targeted by similar accusations, has seen its new president, Romuald Wadagni, take steps towards rapprochement with AES countries shortly after his inauguration on 24 May. A special mention goes to Niger, whose shared border with Benin has remained closed since the July 2023 coup in Niamey. Dialogue had become impossible between the two countries, but the arrival of a new leader in Benin created an opportunity to end what had turned into a vulgar personal quarrel between Nigerien military authorities and former Beninese President Patrice Talon.
The change at the helm of Benin has thus acted as an accelerator for reconciliation between these two neighbours. A “meeting of experts” from Niger and Benin was held in Cotonou on 20-21 June to draft terms for a new cooperation, focusing mainly on defence, security, and conditions for reopening the shared border—a decisive factor for resuming economic activities between Benin and Niger. On this point, the Nigerien delegation emphasised its desire for more information about the alleged presence of “foreign elements” at the Benin-Niger border. This request echoes the persistent suspicion from Niamey’s military authorities that Benin hosts a “French military base” intended to “destabilise Niger” or “finance terrorism”. An accusation that defies common sense: why would Benin finance terrorism when it is itself a target and victim? Such statements have become routine narrative for AES regimes struggling to curb the ongoing deterioration of the security situation on their territories. Their promise to unite military forces against terrorism has not moved beyond speeches. Today, large swathes of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso have become grey zones administered by armed terrorist groups, which the ruling juntas cannot contain from expanding and pursuing their dangerous agenda.
The hour of reconciliation between Niger and Benin has arrived. According to Nigerien Interior and Security Minister Mohamed Toumba, “a new era is opening” for both countries. He noted: “By choosing dialogue over confrontation, we have created value for our economies and security for our populations.” Nigerien and Beninese actors remain aware that behind the security challenge lies the equally crucial economic one, in a region where populations share intertwined destinies. As West Africa returns to a diplomacy of realism and pragmatism, what unfolds between Benin and Niger resembles a pilot case—a model for a reassessed and intelligent management of shared vulnerabilities across the West African space.
Endogenous responses to the security crisis
Initiatives aimed at normalising relations between ECOWAS and AES countries are expected to become clearer in the coming months. Besides reactivating longstanding neighbourhood dynamics that have prevailed in the region, they underline the urgency of endogenous answers to the security equation. This echoes recommendations made last year by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres for “a resumption of dialogue among all West African countries.” In December 2025, Russia, a privileged partner of AES countries, sent the first signals of a diplomatic recalibration in West Africa by calling for “continued pragmatic and mutually beneficial dialogue between ECOWAS and the AES, to find common solutions to counter shared challenges and threats, including the fight against regional terrorism.” These remarks indicate a paradigm shift in international cooperation—a way of reminding Africans that it falls upon them alone to craft the most efficient solutions to their current challenges.
Already, bilateral relational protocols are being observed between the AES and countries like Ghana, Guinea, Togo, and Senegal. Despite their withdrawal from ECOWAS, the Sahelian military regimes have maintained their presence in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA), and their nationals continue to benefit from free movement within the ECOWAS space. Ultimately, one must question the rationale behind the AES promoters’ withdrawal from the regional community. The only available answer points back to the initial dispute: ECOWAS’s condemnation of the coups that occurred in AES countries, and especially the refusal of the bloc’s leaders to work towards a “restoration of constitutional order.” In many respects, the rupture between the AES and ECOWAS resembles a divorce that is artificial or incomplete.
