The synchronized assaults by JNIM and FLA on April 25, 2026, represent a pivotal strategic shift since 2012. By striking Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, and Sévaré simultaneously, these two groups have starkly revealed the shortcomings of a security framework heavily reliant on external partners. The recapture of Kidal undermines the Malian junta’s claims to legitimacy and highlights the limitations of its Russian partnership in confronting jihadist forces. While a direct military takeover of Bamako appears unlikely in the short term, JNIM continues its strategy of attrition. The looming threat of regional destabilization places increasing pressure across the Sahel and on the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea.
The tightening grip on Bamako
The coordinated offensive by Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Front de libération de l’Azawad (FLA) on April 25, 2026, marks a significant escalation in Mali’s security crisis. These unexpected, simultaneous attacks targeted key locations including Bamako, Kati, Kidal, Gao, and Sévaré. They underscore a continuous deterioration of security observed since 2020, a trend exacerbated by the junta’s rise to power in August of that year.
Initially confined to Mali’s northern rural areas, JNIM has steadily enhanced its operational reach, demonstrating increased intensity and coordination. In recent years, its activities have expanded westward and southward into regions previously less affected. The group’s influence now extends beyond Malian borders, impacting coastal nations such as Togo, Benin, and Nigeria. Concurrently, attacks attributed to JNIM have surged, particularly those targeting the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA). In July 2024, FAMA, supported by the Russian Africa Corps, suffered a notable defeat against a coalition of JNIM and CSD-DPA. Since then, JNIM has launched a series of assaults on military bases in diverse locations, from Tombouctou in the north to Bamako in the south and Kayes in the west. Meanwhile, FAMA has also bolstered its capabilities, notably with Turkish-supplied Bayraktar drones, though these are far from sufficient for comprehensive territorial surveillance.
Since September 2025, JNIM has implemented an economic strangulation strategy against Bamako, a capital city of approximately 3.2 million residents. This involves disrupting logistical routes and targeting fuel convoys. The primary objective is the gradual erosion of governmental legitimacy. By directly impacting the population’s living conditions, particularly through rising fuel prices and associated economic disruptions, JNIM aims to weaken the junta’s credibility while positioning itself as a viable alternative. As the junta’s authority wanes in both rural areas and Bamako, JNIM increasingly appears as a credible governance option to the populace. The blockade of the capital effectively stages the state’s perceived impotence. JNIM seeks to enhance its image not through a forceful takeover of the capital, but by demonstrating the existence of an alternative form of authority. In areas under its control, the group has established a parallel administrative structure based on Islamic justice, taxation, and trade regulation, enabling it to present a concrete alternative to an absent state.
A military seizure of the capital remains improbable at present, given JNIM’s estimated strength of 5,000 to 6,000 fighters, compared to a city that concentrates the bulk of Mali’s security forces and infrastructure. Furthermore, JNIM lacks sufficient popular support, especially in urban centers. However, sporadic attacks against the Modibo Keita International Airport, which hosts the Africa Corps base, could become more frequent. Conversely, rural areas, characterized by limited state presence, offer fertile ground for the group’s entrenchment. The Bamako blockade suggests that a direct military capture of the capital is not a short-term objective; instead, the strategy relies on a primarily psychological war of attrition. This increasing pressure on Bamako also serves to concentrate FAMA’s responses, thereby easing their grip on other parts of the territory.
Kidal’s recapture and narrative fragility
The April 25 attacks vividly demonstrate this surge in capabilities. In Kati, the heart of Mali’s military power, Defense Minister Sadio Camara was killed. In Bamako, Modibo Keita Airport was struck. In Kidal, JNIM and FLA regained control of the city, which FAMA and Wagner had recaptured in 2023 in what was then hailed as a historic victory. This strategic reversal is unprecedented since 2013, forcing Africa Corps elements to withdraw from both Kidal and Gao. The pressing question now is whether FAMA can retake the city in the coming weeks.
This recapture of Kidal by JNIM echoes the dynamics of 2012, when Tuareg rebels and jihadist groups initially collaborated before ideological differences caused a rift. JNIM advocates for the implementation of Sharia law, while Tuareg rebels champion an autonomist agenda focused on Azawad. Kidal then became a symbol of this division, contested by both factions. These divergences persist today, yet the identification of common adversaries—the junta and its Russian partner—has fostered an opportunistic tactical convergence. Signs of rapprochement were already circulating in March 2025. According to jihadist movement expert Wassim Nasr, negotiations to combine efforts reportedly took place as early as December 2024. The durability of this opportunistic coalition and its ability to maintain control of Kidal remain to be seen.
These attacks occurred despite reports of a truce that was supposed to be signed in late March 2026 between JNIM and the Malian government. This alleged agreement would have involved the release of several jihadists in exchange for lifting the fuel blockade on Bamako. Mali subsequently denied releasing 200 jihadists. The veracity of this agreement remains questionable; regardless, it clearly failed to halt JNIM’s offensive momentum.
On April 28, JNIM declared a “total siege” on Bamako and demanded that Russians permanently leave Malian territory. The following day, its spokesperson, Mohamed Ramadane, asserted that the regime would fall and that the group intended to “liberate” Gao, Tombouctou, and Ménaka. Such maximalist rhetoric suggests little immediate willingness to negotiate.
The blow to the junta is both political and military. The killing of the Defense Minister is highly significant. More importantly, Africa Corps’ withdrawal from Kidal undermines the narrative upon which the regime had built its legitimacy since 2021: the promise of restored sovereignty through a Russian partnership presented as structurally superior to the French presence. Wagner, and subsequently Africa Corps, were officially portrayed by the junta as the appropriate solution to the country’s insecurity and the guarantor of its power. With Kidal falling again, the Russian security narrative begins to unravel.
While Africa Corps may have faltered against rebels and jihadists, it has largely succeeded in protecting the junta’s power and Assimi Goïta himself, thus fulfilling part of its mandate. This setback weakens their position but does not signal their complete demise in Mali or neighboring countries.
External support under scrutiny
It is important not to overstate JNIM’s immediate ambitions. The group may not necessarily benefit from the immediate collapse of the regime. A weakened but still-present junta serves as a useful adversary, bolstering JNIM’s own legitimacy among the population. Conversely, a political vacuum could facilitate the return of international actors that the group seeks to exclude, and a direct confrontation with Russia could prove particularly costly, as the Russians maintain superiority and potentially possess more troops. Although Russian forces lack the air superiority that French forces enjoyed during Operation Barkhane, Vladimir Putin could, if he wished, send reinforcements to salvage Russia’s position.
In any event, a Russian disengagement does not appear imminent. Moscow swiftly reaffirmed its support for Bamako, and the Russian ambassador was received by Assimi Goïta in the days following the attacks. On Africa Corps’ Telegram channels, an aggressive communication campaign quickly emerged, attempting to regain control of a narrative that was slipping away by showcasing numerous combat images. Withdrawing from Mali, a showcase for the Russian security model in Africa via Wagner and then Africa Corps, would be an admission of defeat for Russia. The Kremlin will therefore seek to preserve its credibility, even if it means increasing its commitment.
It is also worth noting that Russia is not the only external supporter of the junta. Turkey, through the SADAT company, has reportedly been present in Mali since 2024, engaged in a dual mission of protecting the junta and training special forces. This arrangement likely played a role in securing the junta leader during the April 25 attacks. As the situation deteriorates, Ankara might be called upon to play an increasingly significant role in protecting the regime. In a communiqué issued on May 1, FLA spokesperson Mohamed Ramadane called on Turkey to “re-evaluate the nature of their engagement alongside the ruling junta in Bamako, in order to play a positive role in Mali.”
A reconfigured Sahel
The Alliance of Sahel States (AES) has maintained a discreet posture. While a communiqué was issued on April 27 condemning the attacks, neither Niger nor Burkina Faso intervened militarily. Yet, the Liptako-Gourma Charter, which established the alliance in September 2023, includes a mutual assistance clause in the event of an attack on the sovereignty and integrity of its members. Article 6 explicitly states:
« Any attack on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one or more contracting parties shall be considered an aggression against the other parties and shall entail a duty of assistance and relief from all parties, individually or collectively, including the use of armed force, to restore and ensure security within the area covered by the Alliance. »
Furthermore, during the Chiefs of Staff meeting on April 16 and 17, 2026, the three nations had announced their intention to expand their unified force to 15,000 soldiers, up from the original 5,000. Facing similar jihadist threats within their own borders, Niger and Burkina Faso evidently deemed it imprudent to disperse their forces.
Further north, the situation could benefit Algeria. On one hand, the shift of the attacks’ center of gravity towards central and southern Mali moves the threat’s barycenter away from Algeria’s historically targeted borders. On the other hand, Algiers has been pursuing a strategy of Sahelian re-engagement for several months. Evidence includes President Tiani’s state visit to Niger in February 2026, the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project crossing Niger, and the announcement of a 50 billion CFA franc program to modernize Burkina Faso’s infrastructure. Algiers views its influence in the Sahel as a natural extension of its sphere of interest. Its historical rival, Morocco, is advancing its own initiatives with the Atlantic Initiative, launched in 2023, which aims to offer landlocked Sahelian countries access to the Atlantic Ocean via Mauritania. The destabilization of the Malian junta provides Algiers an opportunity to regain momentum, even if relations between the two capitals remain strained, particularly due to Bamako’s alignment with Moroccan positions on Western Sahara.
The current configuration offers Algiers the advantage of a privileged negotiation channel with the FLA, with whom it has historical ties. Under Algeria’s auspices, the 2015 Algiers Accord was negotiated—a framework largely obsolete today but retaining symbolic value. While Algiers refuses dialogue with JNIM, its access to the FLA could nonetheless facilitate mediation between the Tuareg rebels and Bamako. It is precisely as a mediator that Algiers could play a structuring role and appears to wish to reposition itself in the Sahel.
These attacks also coincide with Washington’s efforts to re-engage with Bamako. In February 2026, Nick Checker, head of the Bureau of African Affairs at the State Department, visited Mali to “express the United States’ respect for Mali’s sovereignty.” This rapprochement is part of the new Trump administration’s approach to the three AES juntas to counter Russian influence. These attacks further destabilize an interlocutor with whom the United States is attempting to reconnect.
Towards regional contagion in disarray?
The April 25 attacks signal entry into a new phase: more coordinated, geographically diffuse, and now collaborative between two actors with distinct agendas. However, the risk of regional contagion does not manifest uniformly and requires distinguishing the specific logics of each actor.
The FLA, driven by a nationalist agenda centered on Azawad, has neither the mandate nor the interest to operate beyond northern Mali. Its logic is territorial and identity-based, not transnational. It does not pose a vector of destabilization for Burkina Faso, Niger, or the coastal states.
JNIM, conversely, possesses a demonstrated regional projection capability. It operates in Burkina Faso and Niger, and is extending its pressure towards the Gulf of Guinea. A sustained weakening of the Malian Armed Forces, or even a collapse of the junta, would offer it an expanded sanctuary from which to intensify these operations. Burkina Faso and Niger, whose political survival is partly linked to Bamako’s, would be the first exposed to these developments.
This divergence in agendas raises questions about the durability of the coalition between the two groups. Their rapprochement is based on a common adversary rather than a shared political project. The coalition may endure as long as the war against the junta remains the priority objective. It will very likely fracture once the question of “what comes next” arises, and the control of Kidal will serve as an initial revealing test.
Further west, Senegal and Mauritania, largely spared until now, are not immune. They represent the main access routes for fuel and goods to landlocked Mali, axes that JNIM is already actively targeting in the Kayes region. JNIM does not pose an immediate existential threat to these countries, but the trajectory is concerning. Several attacks could occur at the borders, further exposing these economies to Mali’s security shifts.
In the Gulf of Guinea, the threat to Benin and Togo, already experiencing incursions, follows a different logic. These countries are not directly threatened by the Malian situation, but by what it could trigger downstream. The instability in Burkina Faso, a border country, constitutes the primary vector of contagion towards the coastal states. A further deterioration in Burkina Faso, made more probable by a collapse in Bamako, would be the most immediately threatening scenario for them.
However, the threat is not solely external. An internal coup in Mali cannot be ruled out. The junta has simultaneously intensified its internal repression, risking accelerating its own fragilization. As Wassim Nasr highlights, this radicalization of the regime could reinforce the idea among opponents that the only way to remove the junta is through an internal overthrow. Such a scenario would offer JNIM an additional window of opportunity to consolidate its gains. Ultimately, these attacks reveal the accumulated fragilities of a regional security system reliant on external partners with contested results, and a Malian state whose legitimacy erodes as its capacity to protect its populations diminishes.
