On 20 april 2026, general Évariste Ndayishimiye travelled to Ouagadougou for an official “friendship and working” visit. The Burundian head of state at the time chaired the African Union (AU).
This diplomatic initiative aimed to reopen dialogue between the continental organisation and the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), which groups Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger under the current chairmanship of captain Ibrahim Traoré. It came as AES member states withdrew from AU bodies. The Burundian president visited Burkina Faso, run by a military regime that seized power in a coup, to praise progress in restoring security and stability in a country whose leader has publicly stated that democracy is no longer the order of the day.
Behind the diplomatic talk of “dialogue” and “stability”, one may wonder whether a form of solidarity is emerging among authoritarian regimes that all reject constitutional constraints.
Comparative research on international sanctions (from the European Union and regional organisations) and authoritarian resilience in fragile states, focusing on Burundi and extending to Mali and Niger, examines the political resources these regimes use to resist external pressure.
Convergent institutional trajectories
Burundi and the AES countries share a convergence of institutional paths. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger each faced sanctions from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the EU after coups in 2020 and 2021 (Mali), 2022 (Burkina Faso) and 2023 (Niger). Burundi itself was sanctioned by the EU and the United States in 2016 after president Pierre Nkurunziza decided to run for a third term judged unconstitutional. Such political phenomena call for a transregional comparison that does not merely note surface similarities but highlights deep, convergent logics. The parallel between Burundi and Mali, two countries thousands of kilometres apart in different geopolitical environments, exemplifies this approach.
Designating an enemy
In both cases, designating an enemy — internal or external — is a central mechanism of legitimacy and a powerful driver of internal cohesion. This strategy allows the constant reactivation of the threat depending on the political context: a colonial enemy, a regional enemy, or a diffuse security enemy. In Mali, this mechanism was most intense from early 2022. Driven by a “rally-around-the-flag” effect — where the population unites behind leaders facing an external or perceived threat — the Malian authorities saw their power consolidate. Backed by a civilian component in the second version of the transition following the may 2021 putsch, the military enjoyed massive popular support. Tens of thousands of protesters gathered on the Boulevard de l’Indépendance on 14 january 2022 to denounce the economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed by ECOWAS. They chanted hostility toward Paris and the regional body, accusing them of interference, and demanded a Mali owned solely by its citizens, free from external influence.
In Burundi, Belgium crystallises the anger of supporters of the ruling National Council for the Defense of Democracy – Forces for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD). The former colonial power is blamed for the country’s ethnic divisions and accused of colluding with Rwanda to destabilise the regime. The Burundian government, led by the CNDD-FDD, portrays Brussels as the instigator of EU economic sanctions — a narrative that lets both regimes deflect international criticism into a story of resistance against the former coloniser.
Choosing a regional adversary
Each regime also selects a regional adversary. In Mali, Algeria is accused of hosting opposition figures such as imam Mahmoud Dicko and of colluding with terrorist groups active in the country. The Malian junta announced on 25 january 2024 the “end, with immediate effect” of the Algiers peace agreement. Mali also closed its airspace to Algeria in april 2025 after a similar move by Algiers. In Burundi, Rwanda under Paul Kagame, a Tutsi-led regime, plays that role. President Ndayishimiye has called Kigali a “bad neighbour”, accusing it of sheltering the putschists involved in the 2015 coup attempt. Burundian authorities also charge Rwanda with supporting rebel movements such as RED-Tabara, sometimes linked to other armed groups in the region. This defensive posture led to the closure of land borders with Rwanda in january 2024 and an active military intervention in eastern DRC between august 2022 and december 2025, backing the Congolese armed forces (FARDC) alongside the Wazalendo militias and the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) against the M23 movement backed by Kigali. All these symbolic resources fuel a permanent siege mentality — a condition necessary for the political survival of regimes that rely on external threats as their main fuel.
The security contradiction
A contradiction appears, however, in the security sphere. In Mali, the threat is more immediate, exemplified by attacks from the FLA and JNIM on 25 april 2026, which reinforce the regime’s security narrative. This difference in the nature of the threat leads to distinct logics of legitimation. The Malian junta leader, Assimi Goïta, has freed himself from electoral constraints. In july 2025, the National Transitional Council granted him a renewable five-year mandate without elections or term limits, completing a drift that began with the repeated postponements of the promised march 2024 ballot. The junta no longer needs to legitimise a vote; it presents itself as the sole bulwark capable of defeating JNIM and FLA. Although the Malian economy is resilient, it remains exposed to recurrent power cuts and the gradual withdrawal of development and humanitarian aid. In Burundi, the CNDD-FDD has nominated the incumbent president as its candidate for the 2027 presidential election, and the poll, though controlled, remains a required step. The security record promoted by Gitega does not replace an election; it serves to prepare one, in a context where security discourse can overshadow an economic record marked by fuel and foreign exchange shortages since 2015. Both Burundi and Mali are among the world’s poorest countries — Burundi ranked last in 2023. Does the constant externalisation of responsibility through the permanent construction of an enemy also conceal, as per French political scientist Jean-François Bayart’s analytical grid, internal dynamics of predation that structure authoritarian regimes? Ultimately, the comparison between Mali and Burundi reveals less the uniqueness of each path than the robustness of a common logic shared by regimes that have turned their enemies not into a burden but into their foundation.
