A growing reliance on regional borrowing
The three member states of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) — Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger — remain deeply engaged with the West African regional financial market, according to the latest data. As of 31 July 2026, their combined outstanding public securities stood at approximately 7,727 billion CFA francs, a figure that casts doubt on the narrative of a financial sovereignty built solely on domestic resources.
The political messaging from these capitals has been consistent: sovereignty, a break from past dependencies, funding national efforts through own resources, and rejecting mechanisms seen as externally imposed. Yet the market data tells a more nuanced story.
Breakdown by country
Figures available as of 31 July 2026 show that the three AES states maintain a strong presence on the regional public securities market of the West African Monetary Union (UMOA). The outstanding amounts are as follows:
- Burkina Faso: 2,989.98 billion CFA francs
- Mali: 2,606.93 billion CFA francs
- Niger: 2,130.47 billion CFA francs
These sums do not represent debt owed to UEMOA as an institution. They are public securities still in circulation on the regional market — a crucial distinction. The states borrow from investors who purchase their bills and bonds, and UMOA-Titres organises this very market for state financing.
Burkina Faso: close to 3,000 billion CFA francs outstanding
Burkina Faso’s outstanding securities on the regional market reached 2,989.98 billion CFA francs as of 31 July 2026, accounting for roughly 12.4% of the total UMOA outstanding of 24,073.53 billion CFA francs at the same date. The figure is all the more notable because Burkina’s outstanding amount rose by 2.46% over the course of a month.
During the early months of 2026, Ouagadougou continued to raise funds on the regional market while simultaneously making repayments. In May alone, Burkina Faso mobilised 99.50 billion CFA francs in Treasury bonds and repaid 72.04 billion CFA francs. In other words, regional financing has not disappeared with the sovereignty discourse: it remains a key tool for cash management and state funding.
Mali: over 2,600 billion CFA francs
Mali’s outstanding amount stood at 2,606.93 billion CFA francs as of 31 July 2026, representing about 10.8% of the regional total. This is not a one-off occurrence. UMOA-Titres data show that by the end of May 2026, Mali’s outstanding amount had already reached 2,637.64 billion CFA francs. During that single month, Bamako mobilised 93.50 billion CFA francs while repayments totalled 110.07 billion CFA francs.
Mali thus continued to borrow and repay simultaneously, in a classic debt management pattern. The issue is not simply whether Bamako borrows. The real question is at what pace, at what cost, and to finance what expenditures.
Niger: more than 2,130 billion CFA francs
Niger’s outstanding amount reached 2,130.47 billion CFA francs as of 31 July 2026, about 8.9% of the total UMOA outstanding. It is the trajectory that draws particular attention. Between April and May 2026, Niger’s outstanding amount jumped from 1,732.05 billion to 2,120.45 billion CFA francs — an increase of nearly 388.4 billion CFA francs in a single month, according to UMOA-Titres data.
This dramatic rise is explained in part by major financing and debt reprofiling operations. In May 2026, Niger mobilised 567.49 billion CFA francs, including 519.51 billion in Treasury bonds and 47.97 billion in bills, while repaying 191.31 billion CFA francs. Days earlier, a large-scale operation allowed Niger to handle 446.386 billion CFA francs in securities, including about 59.710 billion CFA francs in short-term securities bought back to ease immediate cash-flow pressures. Net resources generated were estimated at around 327 billion CFA francs.
7,727 Billion CFA francs: the figure that unsettles
Adding the three outstanding amounts as of 31 July: 2,989.98 + 2,606.93 + 2,130.47 = 7,727.38 billion CFA francs. In other words, nearly 7,727 billion CFA francs in public securities from the three AES states remain in circulation on the regional market. For comparison, all UMOA states together showed an outstanding amount of 24,073.53 billion CFA francs at that time. The three AES countries alone thus represented about 32.1% of the entire regional outstanding.
A contradiction with the sovereignty discourse?
This is where the real subject of inquiry lies. It would be wrong to claim that these three states are entirely dependent on the regional market. It would be equally wrong to assert that they have stopped using it. The data demonstrate, on the contrary, a strong and persistent use of the regional financial market.
The market is not merely an external mechanism imposed on states: it has long been a normal channel for financing national budgets in the West African monetary space. But a political and economic question remains: can a policy be presented as fully autonomous when several thousand billion CFA francs are raised from regional investors to fund state needs? The answer requires looking beyond slogans.
The AES paradox
The paradox is even more striking since Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger withdrew from ECOWAS. Politically, the three countries have affirmed their desire to build an autonomous path. Financially, however, they continue to use the regional UMOA market — and that market relies largely on banks and investors from the West African space.
An analysis published in late 2025 noted a decline in the exposure of investors from other UEMOA countries to AES state debt: their holdings fell from 3,174 billion to 2,801 billion CFA francs, a drop of 373 billion CFA francs between the fourth quarter of 2024 and the third quarter of 2025. At the same time, cross-holdings of securities among the three AES countries decreased by 622 billion CFA francs, to around 3,160 billion CFA francs.
This phenomenon warrants monitoring: when investors become more cautious, financing can become more expensive and more difficult.
The real indicator: the cost of debt
The amount of outstanding debt alone is not enough. To judge its sustainability, one must also examine:
- interest rates;
- maturities;
- annual repayment amounts;
- tax mobilisation capacity;
- economic growth;
- the share devoted to security spending;
- the ability to roll over maturing loans.
This is precisely where the risk lies. A state can have a high but manageable outstanding amount if it has sufficient revenue and solid growth. Conversely, a state can face serious difficulties with a smaller debt if a large portion of securities matures simultaneously or if interest rates become too high.
Niger offers a glimpse of the problem
The Nigerien case perfectly illustrates this mechanism. In May 2026, the country mobilised 567.49 billion CFA francs but also repaid 191.31 billion CFA francs. Another operation involved 446.386 billion CFA francs, part of which was used to buy back maturing securities. This means that part of the new resources does not necessarily constitute new money available to finance projects. It may serve to refinance existing debt.
This is a common mechanism on bond markets, but it must be stated clearly: raising several hundred billion does not automatically mean that those hundreds of billions are added in full to the resources available for development.
The trap of ‘billions mobilised’ announcements
This is probably one of the most important points to remember. When a government announces an issue of 500 billion CFA francs, several questions must be asked:
- How much is genuinely new?
- How much is used to repay old securities?
- What is the interest rate?
- What is the duration?
- What will the total bill be for the taxpayer?
In Niger’s case, the May 2026 operation shows exactly why this distinction is indispensable: 446.386 billion CFA francs in gross amount handled, but around 327 billion CFA francs in net resources generated. The difference is not an accounting detail. It completely changes the political reading of the figure.
Conclusion: sovereignty does not erase debt
The debate on the AES should not simply pit ‘sovereignty’ against ‘dependence’. The figures tell something more complex. As of 31 July 2026, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger together held 7,727.38 billion CFA francs in outstanding public securities on the regional UMOA market.
This is not debt directly owed to UEMOA as an organisation. It is debt owed to investors who subscribed to securities issued by these states. But the observation remains: the three countries claiming greater financial autonomy continue to rely heavily on regional bond financing to cover their needs.
The real question is therefore no longer whether the AES borrows. It is how far these states can continue to borrow without the cost of this ‘financial sovereignty’ eventually weighing heavily on their future budgets.
